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Without the assistance of Medicaid, more than twenty-five percent of all children
in the United States would not have access to dental care.1 However, mere eligibility
does not guarantee good dental health. In fact, in many states, children enrolled in
Medicaid rarely receive adequate dental care.2

In 2007, twelve-year-old Deamonte

Driver died as the result of an infection from a tooth abscess spreading to his brain.3
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1

Shelly Gehshan, Andrew Snyder, & Julie Paradise, Filling an Urgent Need: Improving Children’s Access
to Dental Care in Medicaid and SCHIP (National Academy for State Health Policy, Washington, D.C.),
July 2008 at 1. (available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7792.pdf). An additional seven million
children rely on the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Id. SCHIP covers some dental
benefits for some children in families that do not qualify for Medicaid but cannot afford insurance. This
note focuses primarily on Medicaid structures. For more information on how states administer SCHIP
benefits, see Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx). The Patient Protection and Accountable Care Act (PPACA) will extend
dental coverage to 5.3 million more children by 2014 through expansions to both Medicaid and SCHIP.
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States,
Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 1 (available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/The_State_of_Children's_Dental_health.pdf).
2
Low-income children suffer approximately twice as many cavities as other children. These cavities are
much more likely to go untreated as well. Oral Health in America: A Report of the Surgeon General (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research,
National Institutes of Health, Rockville, MD), 2000.
3
Lindy McCollum-Broundley, A Place to Call Home: Expanding Access to Dental Care for Children &
Special Needs Patients, Gatordentist Today (Fall 2007) at 8 (available at
http://www.dental.ufl.edu/Offices/News/publications/GDTNewsletter_Fall07.pdf).
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Deamonte visited physicians all of his life but had never visited a dentist.4 The tooth
abscess went undiagnosed until his mother, with the necessary help of one lawyer, one
helpline supervisor, and three case management professionals, finally found a dentist in
Maryland who accepted Medicaid.5 Only 900 out of 5,500 dentists in Maryland accepted
Medicaid at the time.6 The cost of Deamonte’s subsequent brain surgeries and hospital
stay totaled over a quarter of a million dollars.7 A simple tooth extraction would have
cost approximately only eighty dollars and would have saved his life.8
Unfortunately, this story is not all too uncommon in the United States. Only
38.1% of Medicaid children received any dental care in 2009.9 The consequences of so
many children failing to see a dentist has consequences that extend beyond just poor
health indications. Failing to encourage and provide adequate dental care results in farreaching social consequences for Medicaid patients and financial consequences for states.
Patients that do not receive adequate dental care face social stigma.10 When a patient
does not have access to preventive care, problems go untreated until the problem worsens
enough to force the patient to seek emergency care. Emergency care often entails tooth
extraction. Missing teeth signify poor social background. Patients must then fight this
stigma every time they interview for a new job. This crisis also affects employers, as
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Id.
The Silent Epidemic (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08HVcfxRg-k&feature=related.
6
June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: Why poor folks are short on teeth., Slate Magazine (Oct. 1,
2009) (available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_american_way_of_dentistry/2009/10/the_american_way_of_dentistr
y_3.html).
7
Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist, The Washington Post (Feb. 28, 2007)
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/27/AR2007022702116.html).
8
Id.
9
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter, supra note 1, at 10.
10
S. Hyde, W.A. Satariano, & J.A. Weintraub, Welfare Dental Intervention Improves Employment and
Quality of Life, J. OF DENTAL RES., no. 85 (2006) at 79-84.
5
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poor dental health results in employees missing many hours of work each year.11 In
addition to patients and employers, states suffer when dental indications go undiagnosed
and untreated. Emergency room visits for tooth decay-related indications are extremely
expensive and, unfortunately, extremely common.12 Poor dental health is linked to more
serious, chronic, and expensive health conditions.13 The earlier in life patients receive
their first dental screening, the lower future treatment will cost the state.14 Thus, the
incentives exist for states to address this growing dental health crisis. However, the
barriers to accomplishing this are not so easily overcome.
Medicaid beneficiaries face many challenges in accessing dental care even when
it is available. Dentists often practice in affluent areas to where public transportation is
extremely inconvenient.15 Patients in rural areas face even greater challenges. In 2000,
there were 224 counties where even private payers could not find a dentist.16 Many
Medicaid patients are often unable to schedule appointments as few dental assistants
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An estimated 164 million work hours each year are lost due to oral disease. Mary McGinn-Shapiro,
Medicaid Coverage of Adult Dental Services, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY (2008) at 1
(available at
http://nashp.org/sites/default/files/Adult%20Dental%20Monitor.pdf?q=files/Adult%20Dental%20Monitor.
pdf).
12
The amount of emergency room visits related to preventable dental conditions in 2009 rose sixteen
percent to 830,590. A study revealed that 330,000 cases cost approximately $110 million. These costs are
increasing. For example, the average charge per emergency visit for young children with dental conditions
increased by thirty percent over the last five years. In Florida, approximately one-third of these visits in
2010 were paid through Medicaid. However, perhaps most alarmingly, the emergency room was the first
“dental visit” for one in every four children in the state of Washington. A Costly Dental Destination, (The
Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2012 at 1-3. (available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/A%20Costly%20Dental%20Destination.pdf).
13
A study revealed that the average cost of care for children that received dental care before the age of one
was more than half of the average cost of care for children that did not visit a dentist until ages four through
five. Matthew F. Savage, Jessica Y. Lee, Jonathan B. Kotch, William F. Vann, Jr., Early Preventive Dental
Visits: Effects on Subsequent Utilization & Costs, NEOREVIEWS, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 1, 2004) at
e418-e423.
14
June Thomas, The American Way of Dentistry: Why poor folks are short on teeth., supra note 6.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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speak multiple languages.17 Additionally, many Medicaid patients do not seek out dental
care due to a lack of education about the importance of dental care and a lack of
awareness that they actually have dental benefits. Many Medicaid patients rely primarily
on emergency rooms for their medical needs due to this lack of education and
awareness.18 These barriers cause many Medicaid patients to miss appointments, further
frustrating the few providers that will treat these patients.19
Another barrier is a lack of dentists who are willing to accept Medicaid. Apart
from the inconveniences mentioned above, Medicaid administrative structures also
frustrate providers. Dentists avoid treating Medicaid patients because of low payment
rates, inconvenient claims procedures, and slow payment.20 Dentists usually operate
small businesses and incur high overhead costs.21 These costs cover about sixty percent
of revenue.22 While increasing payment rates is the obvious first step, and perhaps a
necessary step, in encouraging dentists to participate, it alone is not sufficient.23 Through
structural reforms, states can target the problems of inconvenient procedures and slow
payment. Improvements in administrative efficiency will allow states to better allocate
funds to pay dentists higher rates.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Id.
Shelly Gehshan, Paetra Hauck, & Julie Scales, Increasing Dentists’ Participation in Medicaid and
SCHIP, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2001) (available at
http://204.131.235.67/programs/health/Forum/oralhealth.htm#introbot).
19
Id.
20
Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates
on Access to Dental Care, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY (2008) at 1 (available at
http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/CHCF_dental_rates.pdf)).
21
Shelly Gehshan, Andrew Snyder, & Julie Paradise, Filling an Urgent Need: Improving Children’s Access
to Dental Care in Medicaid and SCHIP, supra note 1, at 9.
22
Id.
23
“A majority of experts interviewed felt that adequate reimbursement rates (meaning rates that at least met
the overhead expenses of dentists in private practice) were necessary—but not sufficient on their own – to
improve access to Medicaid dental services. Simply injecting funding into higher rates was not thought to
be enough to substantially improve the program.” Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly
Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 25.
18
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In order to overcome barriers to utilization and access, states should adopt the
following three-fold approach: 1) States should provide outreach and education, 2) States
should increase reimbursement rates paid to dental providers, and 3) States should reform
their Medicaid administrative structures.
States have many options in how they construct Medicaid administrative
structures. Congress amended the Social Security Act several times to allow states a
considerable amount of freedom in how states can administer Medicaid benefits.24 Many
states have taken advantage of these amendments by using managed care to improve the
administrational of dental Medicaid benefits.25

However, states must be careful to

contract with dental maintenance organizations on terms best suited to the unique area of
dental health.26 To better serve the unique needs of dental providers and Medicaid
patients, states should restructure their Medicaid structures by contracting with a single
dental maintenance organization to exclusively provide dental benefits. The state should
assume at least some degree of risk, while capitalizing on the dental maintenance
organization’s established network, expertise, and commonplace claims procedures. The
state should also ensure that the vendor pays providers on a fee-for-service basis. Both
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See infra Section I.
Forty-two states contract with at least one third-party to help administer dental Medicaid benefits.
Sixteen states administer at least some dental Medicaid benefits through typical managed care plans.
Under the typical managed care model, the state transfers risk to the managed care organization (MCO) by
paying the MCO on a per beneficiary per month basis. However, states have increasingly switched to a
more tempered form of managed care. These vendors are often paid under administrative services only
(ASO) contracts. Thus, these vendors do not bear any risk but are still responsible for processing claims,
maintaining networks, and responding to provider inquiries. Thirty-one states administer at least some
dental Medicaid benefits through nonrisk vendors. Notice that some states contract with both types of
vendors. Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).
26
If done improperly, administrative costs can increase while utilization and participation decline rapidly.
This was the result of Florida’s Miami-Dade County Pilot program. The state passed too much risk to both
the vendor and providers, and providers did not receive adequate reimbursement. See Burton L. Edelstein,
Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value for State Dollars (Collins
Center for Public Policy, Miami, FL) Aug. 2006.
25
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quantitative and qualitative reasons support this approach as the ideal administrative
structure for dental Medicaid benefits.
Part I of this piece will outline the statutory framework through which states
administer dental Medicaid benefits. Part II briefly touches on how patient outreach and
assistance programs can increase the utilization of dental services, thereby indirectly
increasing provider participation.

Part III briefly discusses the need to increase

reimbursement rates paid to providers in order to promote participation in Medicaid. Part
IV will discuss recent state reforms designed to deal with this dental crisis. Part V
evaluates how successful these different approaches have been in terms of the available
quantitative data.

Part VI proposes how states can reform Medicaid administrative

structures to best increase provider participation and utilization of dental services.

I.

Statutory Framework

Title XIX of the Social Security Act only requires states to cover dental benefits
for Medicaid-eligible individuals under the age of twenty-one.27 States have the option of
whether or not to cover dental services for Medicaid-eligible adults.28 Dental benefits are
guaranteed for eligible children as part of Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program.29

Under the EPSDT program, states

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27

Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396 et seq. (2012).
In 2007, six states offered no coverage for adult dental Medicaid benefits, sixteen states covered only
emergency services, thirteen states excluded at least one service category from coverage, and only sixteen
states offered comprehensive coverage. Mary McGinn-Shapiro, Medicaid Coverage of Adult Dental
Services, supra note 11, at Figure 1.
29
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396 et seq. (2012).
28
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determine the scope of covered dental services within certain parameters.30 States also
have considerable freedom in determining how these benefits are administered. In fact,
many states do not administer dental Medicaid benefits themselves, but rather mandate
that all beneficiaries enroll in a plan administered by a private commercial entity, either a
Dental Maintenance Organization (DMO) that resembles a typical Managed Care
Organization (MCO), a Dental Benefits Manager (DBM) that does not take on risk, or a
fiscal agent that performs administrative functions but does not manage other private
health insurance plans.31 Other states administer dental benefits themselves through state
agencies.32 While the Social Security Act originally forbade states from requiring that a
Medicaid beneficiary enroll in a managed care plan, these restrictions were later
relaxed.33 Section 2175 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198134 (“OBRA”)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30

At minimum, states must cover dental services for relief of pain and infections, restorative services, and
services necessary for the maintenance of dental health. States are also required to develop a dental
periodicity schedule with the advice of recognized dental organizations. A dental periodicity schedule
determines when a screening is medically necessary. 42 U.S.C. §§§ 1396(r)(1)(B), 1396a(a)(43)(C),
§1396d(r).
31
Sixteen states (including the District of Columbia) enroll at least some Medicaid beneficiaries in typical
managed care plans. States are more likely to rely on managed care plans in urban areas if they choose to
operate an additional, separate traditional fee-for-service system. There has been a trend to move away
from the global managed care system that about half of the states converted to in the 1990s. Some states
have completely tried to move away from contracting through commercial vendors, such as Maryland,
which initiated a pilot program in 2008 to experiment with state-administered benefits. Other states have
retained managed care plans but mitigate the amount of risk borne by the vendor, such as Rhode Island, or
prohibit plans from passing risk along to providers, such as Arizona. Nonrisk vendors are typically refered
to as Dental Benefits Managers (DBMs). Other states similarly contract with nonrisk commercial agents
but contract with agents that specialize in information technology rather than health network maintenance.
For example, West Virginia contracts with Unisys, an information technology company that processes
claims but also is responsible for provider enrollment. Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental
Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx); James J. Crall & Donald
Schneider, Medicaid Program Administration (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), Mar. 2004 at 3
(available at http://www.ada.org/sections/professionalResources/pdfs/medicaid_administration.pdf).
32
For example, the Washington State Health Care Authority, a state agency within the Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services, administers dental Medicaid benefits in Washington state. The
state does not contract with any fiscal agents. Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn.,
Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).
33
For a discussion of the history of the use of managed care in Medicaid, see Nicolette Highsmith &
Stephen A. Somers, Medicaid Managed Care: From Cost Savings to Accountability and Quality
Improvement, EVAL. HEALTH PROF. Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 2000) at 385-396.
34
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357-933 (1981).
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provided a waiver to allow states to mandate enrollment in managed care plans.35 This §
1915(b) “freedom of choice” waiver became very popular. By 1997, forty states operated
at least one program through the § 1915(b) waiver.36 Another waiver also became
popular in the early 1980s. The § 1115 “research and demonstration” waiver was added
in 1962, but in the 1980s, the Secretary of the Department of Human Health Services
(HHS) began to approve states’ use of it to develop Medicaid managed care initiatives.37
Through this section, the Secretary waived Medicaid’s freedom of choice mandates as
well as other provisions of the Act, such as eligibility, provider, and administrative
requirements.38

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 now allows states to force

beneficiaries to join managed care plans without obtaining a waiver.39 Many states that
have reformed their dental Medicaid programs have done so through § 1115 waivers.40
Other states should look to these administrative reforms as examples of how to improve
dental health among Medicaid beneficiaries. Along with raising reimbursement rates

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35

42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b).
42 U.S.C.S. § 1115; see also Sara Rosenbaum & Julie Darnell, Medicaid Managed Care: An Analysis of
the Health Care Financing Administration’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, (The George Washington
University Medical Center – Center for Health Policy Research, Washington, D.C.), 1998 at 4 (available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14947).
37
Sara Rosenbaum & Julie Darnell, Medicaid Managed Care: An Analysis of the Health Care Financing
Administration’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 36, at 4-5.
38
A § 1115 waiver permits the Secretary to approve programs that vary regionally, offer different benefits
to different groups, expand eligibility standards, mandate enrollment in managed care, and make alterations
to Medicaid payment requirements. However, plans must not reduce access or quality of care, must be
budget neutral, must guard against unnecessary utilization, and must maintain quality assurance processes.
However, the rate at which the Federal government contributes to Medicaid expenditures cannot be waived.
For a summary of § 1115 requirements, see 1115 Waiver, (ITUP Los Angeles Regional Workgroup, Los
Angeles, CA) (available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/6267.pdf); see also Sara
Rosenbaum & Julie Darnell, Medicaid Managed Care: An Analysis of the Health Care Financing
Administration’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 36, at 4-5.
39
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (1997).
40
See Leighton Ku, Marilyn Ellwood, Sheila Hoag, Barbara Ormond, & Judith Woolridge, Evolution of
Medicaid Managed Care System and Eligibility Expansions, Health Care Financing Rev., Vol. 22, No. 2
(Winter 2000) (available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads//00winterpg7.pdf); see also 1115 Waiver, supra
note 38.
36
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paid to providers and establishing outreach and assistance programs, structural reform is
a necessary piece of the puzzle of ending the current dental health crisis.

II.

Patient Outreach and Assistance

Medicaid beneficiaries face barriers beyond the mere lack of dentists willing to
treat Medicaid patients. As previously explained, these barriers include: geographic
barriers, language barriers, and social barriers.41 These problems can be addressed by
providing outreach and assistance to Medicaid patients. Examples include: conducting
face-to-face meetings to discuss coverage and locate a dentist in the area,42 distributing
educational materials,43 establishing hotlines and websites listing available providers,44
and establishing a case management system to address cancellations and transportation
problems.45
Addressing these concerns will not only encourage Medicaid enrollees to seek
care, but it will relieve inconvenience for providers. As such, more providers will accept
Medicaid patients, and then increased access to care will allow for greater utilization of
that care.

However, compliance issues are not the only inconveniences faced by

providers. States must also address poor reimbursement and administrative hassles.
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See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
For example, in South Carolina, Medicaid staff actually visits beneficiaries to discuss available benefits
and to help locate a dentist. For similar examples used by states, see James J. Crall & Donald Schneider,
Enhancing Dental Medicaid Outreach and Care Coordination (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), Mar.
2004 at 2.
43
For example, brochures in Virginia and Washington are specifically tailored to the needs of Medicaid
patients. Id.
44
For examples, see id. at 3.
45
For example, in Michigan, local health departments contact families with children that are due for dental
care and schedule appointments. Id. at 2.
42
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III.

Reimbursement Rate Increases

States must take the additional step of increasing reimbursement rates paid to
providers for services performed on Medicaid patients. Dentists incur high overhead
costs but often do not receive sufficient reimbursement to cover these costs.46 In most
states, Medicaid reimburses dentists less than half of what dentists receive from private
payers.47 In some cases, dentists take a loss, and treating Medicaid patients becomes an
act of charity.48 While many dentists readily accept fifteen to twenty percent discounts
when participating in a preferred provider network in competitive markets, many
Medicaid programs discount seventeen percent from the fiftieth percentile of fees
charged by dentists.49 This results in fees that only twenty-five percent of area dentists
would accept, without taking into account other Medicaid-specific burdens on
providers.50 Increasing this provider base would allow for more patients to receive care
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Andrew Snyder, Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four
Populations (National Academy for State Health Policy, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2009. at 1.
47
For example, in 2010, Medicaid only reimbursed California dentists 32.8% of the median regional
average retail fee. The problem is worsened by the fact that the cost of living in California in 2010 was
also over 30% higher than the national average cost of living. See Appendix C; see also Andrew Snyder,
Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four Populations, supra note 46, at
1-2.
48
For example, in Tennessee, prior to reform, dentists absorbed sixty percent of the cost of each procedure
they performed on a Medicaid patient. Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The
Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 8.
Some scholars note the detrimental effects of a health system that relies on such benevolence.
Through the willingness of providers to treat patients despite inadequate compensation, government
programs have been able to shift the cost of this care to private insurers and providers. Political leaders
then escape accountability for the health of the nation’s uninsured poor. They are free to vote down
initiatives that would offer more coverage to this population, as it is easier to rely on the benevolence of
providers. Frank Pasquale, Dental Dilemmas and the Limits of Charity, Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/dental_dilemmas.html (Dec. 24, 2007) (citing Uwe
Reinhardt, US Health Care Stands Adam Smith on His Head, BMJ 335(7628), 1020 (Nov. 17, 2007)).
49
James J. Crall & Donald Schneider, Medicaid Reimbursement – Using Marketplace Principles to
Increase Access to Dental Services, (American Dental Association, Chicago, IL) 2004 at 1-2 (available at
http://www.ada.org/sections/professionalResources/pdfs/medicaid_reimbursement.pdf).
50
Id.
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and would cut down on patient travel time.51 Increasing rates is necessary for this to
happen.52
While increasing payment rates is the obvious first step, and a necessary step, in
encouraging dentists to participate, it alone is not sufficient.53 Administrative burdens
must also be addressed. Increasing rates is also the more difficult piece of the solution
politically and can counteract gains if state spending spurs inflation.54 Even states that
have demonstrated a dedication to improving rates for dental services, such as Arizona,
have had their efforts staunched by recent budgetary crises.55 In order to sustain effective
rates, states face the decision to allocate more funds to Medicaid budgets or to make
Medicaid structures more efficient.

The latter goal can be accomplished through

administrative reforms. If states contract with private vendors on proper terms, these
private vendors will more efficiently and effectively administer dental Medicaid benefits.

IV.

Different State Approaches56

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51

Michigan improved dental utilization and cut patient travel time in half by improving provider
participation rates from about twenty-five percent to eighty percent from 2000 to 2001. Medicaid,
American Dental Association, http://www.ada.org/2387.aspx (last visited May 4, 2012).
52
Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates
on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 25.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts Seen as a Sign of the Times, THE N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html (Dec. 4, 2010).
56
Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, twenty-five states administer dental benefits together
with medical benefits, twenty-two states employ carve-outs, and four states administer dental benefits
partially through a carve-out. Nine states choose to administer dental Medicaid benefits themselves, while
thirty-two states contract with fiscal agents and ten states contract with fiscal agents but still administer
some benefits. These fiscal agents come in many forms, including DMOs, nonrisk DBMs, and claims
processing agencies. Of those states that contracted out administrative responsibilities, twenty-four states
did not transfer any risk to the contractor, eleven states transferred some degree of risk, and seven states
transferred risk to some vendors but not others. Of the forty-two states that contract with third-party
agents, twenty-one states contract with multiple agents and twenty-one states contract with only a single
agent. Forty-two states reimburse providers on a fee-for-service basis, nine states employ both fee-forservice and capitation, and no states reimburse providers just through capitated payments. Medicaid
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a. Tennessee
In 2002, Tennessee performed a complete overhaul of its Medicaid structure.57
Prior to 2002, Tennessee used multiple managed care organizations to administer both
medical and dental benefits.58 Under this program, only 386 dental providers treated
Medicaid beneficiaries, and only thirty-six percent of enrollees ages six through twenty
received any dental care.59 In John B. v. Menke,60 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee held that Tennessee violated federal EPSDT requirements
by failing to provide adequate dental care as well as other EPSDT benefits. The court
ordered that the state carve out its under-twenty one population from the overall
Medicaid structure.61

Tennessee went even farther by further carving out the

administration of dental services from the administration of other EPSDT services.62
Where multiple managed care organizations continue to administer general Medicaid
benefits, Tennessee contracted with only one dental benefits manager (DBM) to
administer dental benefits.63

Tennessee’s DBM, Doral Dental, operates under an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx). Section IV offers a survey of these different approaches.
57
Tennessee first implemented a Medicaid managed care in 1994 under a Section 1115 waiver from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS). This program, named “TennCare” expired on June 30, 2002.
The 2002 reforms resulted in a new demonstration program, named “TennCare II,” which will operate
through June 30, 2013. For an overview of TennCare, see TennCare Overview (last visited April 25,
2012), http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/news-about.html.
58
Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population,
HEALTH POLICY PUBLICATION (Missouri Foundation for Health, St. Louis, MO), Summer 2008 at 9
(available at http://www.mffh.org/mm/files/DentalComplianceMFH.pdf).
59
David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the
Underserved – A White Paper (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), Oct. 2004 at 15 (available at
http://www.ada.org/sections/advocacy/pdfs/topics_access_whitepaper.pdf).
60
176 F. Supp. 2d 786 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)
61
Id. at 807.
62
David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 15.
63
Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population,
supra note 58, at 9.
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administrative services only (ASO) contract.64 Under an ASO contract, the state takes on
full risk for the cost of benefit claims and pays the vendor an administrative fee. In
return, the DBM maintains a network of providers, processes claims, pays providers, and
performs review procedures.65 Tennessee also increased the rate of reimbursement to the
75th percentile of regional commercial fees.66
By 2007, provider participation improved by approximately one hundred twenty
percent.67 Utilization of dental care by children improved from thirty-six percent to fiftyone percent within four years of these reforms.68 Before these reforms, providers only
received forty percent of their cost for each procedure.69 In reforming the program,
Tennessee followed the suggestions of the ADA and switched to rates matched to the
seventy-fifth percentile of dental fees in the East South Central region.70 Dentists now
earn a profit rather than taking a loss for treating a Medicaid patient. Financing is
determined year to year by state appropriations, so the legislature has ultimate control
over the fee schedule.71

b. Arizona
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Id.
Id. at 9-10.
66
David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 15.
67
Alison Borchgrevink, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Rates
on Access to Dental Care, supra note 20, at 8.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 16.
71
Id. at 17.
65
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Arizona relies on eighteen different MCOs to administer both medical and dental
services.72 The state, therefore, does not rely on a carve-out. Arizona takes advantage of
the integration of the administration dental and medical benefits by requiring physicians
to screen for dental problems and refer patients to dentists.73 Medicaid beneficiaries tend
to rely more heavily on primary care than they do dental care.74 Through this referral
process, Arizona sought to work around this reliance on primary care in order to
encourage utilization.75 Arizona addressed the problems of access and utilization further
by restricting MCOs in terms of how they pay dentists, what benefits they offer, and how
they must maintain their networks. Arizona expressly prohibits plans from capitating
providers.76 The Interim Study Committee on Dental Care found that providers were
attracted to plans that paid on a fee-for-service basis.77 Arizona also requires that plans
offer minimum dental benefits.78 This includes ensuring that beneficiaries can see the
dentist at least twice a year for preventive care and that the care that they receive is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72

Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from
Other States (California HealthCare Foundation, Oakland, CA), July 2009 at 9 (available at
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/M/PDF%20MedicaidDentalLessonsSt
ates.pdf).
73
Arizona revised its Medical Policy Manual by imposing new mandates on physicians. Medical Policy
Manual § 430(A)(7) (available at http://www.phxautism.org/wp-content/pdf/resourcesadvocacy/2.%20EPSDT%20Service,%20Policy%20430.pdf); see also Kim McPherson, State Strategies to
Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population, supra note 58, at 15.
74
Many Medicaid patients have never been educated about the importance of preventive dental care. It is
commonly the case that dental indications go unscreened and untreated until the indication has evolved into
a more complex health issue. It is only then where the patient seeks care in the emergency room of a
hospital, which are often ill-equipped to handle dental care. See, e.g., Lindy McCollum-Broundley, A
Place to Call Home: Expanding Access to Dental Care for Children & Special Needs Patients, supra note
3.
75
Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population,
supra note 58, at 15 (“Research has found that children who receive medical care are more likely to receive
dental care than those who received no medical care.”).
76
Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from
Other States, supra note 72, at 9.
77
ACCCHS DENTAL CARE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (April 2008) (available at
http://azahcccs.gov/reporting/Downloads/DentalCareTaskForce_1998.pdf) (“the majority of the health
plans have implemented fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements effective October 1997 which have
significantly increased the number of dental providers”).
78
For a list of benefits, see Medical Policy Manual § 430(A)(7).
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consistent with the community standard of care.79 The state also requires plans to meet
minimum network requirements.80

Dentists receive relatively high rates of

reimbursement in Arizona. Of all of the states (including the District of Columbia),
Arizona offered the fifth highest rate of reimbursement in 2010.81 Dentists are currently
paid 68.9 percent of median retail fees.82 However, providers face future payment cuts in
the wake of ongoing budget cuts.83 Medicaid utilization increased from below thirty
percent in 2000, when payment structure reform had just taken place, to 47.2% in 2009.84
Dentists are currently paid 68.9 percent of median retail fees.85 However, providers face
future payment cuts in the wake of ongoing budget cuts.86
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Medical Policy Manual §§ 430(A)(7)(b)(1), 430(C).
Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from
Other States, supra note 72, at 9.
81
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States,
Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 25.
82
Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from
Other States, supra note 72, at 9.
83
Arizona reduced its Medicaid dental fee schedule by 5% in 2001. ACCCHS, PUBLIC NOTICE OF
INFORMATION (April, 1, 2011) (available at
http://www.azahcccs.gov/publicnotices/Downloads/rates/April2011FFSRates.pdf). However, the current
governor seeks to restore these rates by 2013. See STATE AGENCY BUDGETS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR, EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2012). Budget
constraints have also led Arizona to eliminate coverage for emergency dental procedures. Such cuts are not
all too uncommon. According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 29 states reduced payments to
providers and 20 cut benefits not required by federal law in 2010. See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts
Seen as a Sign of the Times, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010) (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html).
84
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter - Arizona (The Pew Center on the
States, Washington, D.C.), May 2011 (available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg/Initiatives/Childrens_D
ental_Health/048_11_DENT_50_State_Factsheets_Arizona_052311_web.pdf).
85
Id.
86
Arizona reduced its Medicaid dental fee schedule by 5% in 2001. ACCCHS, PUBLIC NOTICE OF
INFORMATION (April, 1, 2011) (available at
http://www.azahcccs.gov/publicnotices/Downloads/rates/April2011FFSRates.pdf). However, the current
governor seeks to restore these rates by 2013. See STATE AGENCY BUDGETS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR, EXECUTIVE BUDGET OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2012). Budget
constraints have also led Arizona to eliminate coverage for emergency dental procedures. Such cuts are not
all too uncommon. According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 29 states reduced payments to
providers and 20 cut benefits not required by federal law in 2010. See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts
Seen as a Sign of the Times, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010) (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html).
80
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c. Rhode Island
In 2006, Rhode Island initiated its RIte Smiles program.87 Rhode Island switched
from a traditional state-administered fee-for-service structure to a managed care
structure.88 The state phased in the program at a relatively moderate pace. Currently,
only thirty-one percent of Medicaid EPSDT-eligible children receive dental benefits
under this managed care structure.89

Rhode Island relies on only one commercial

vendor.90 Both the state and its vendor, UnitedHealthcare Dental, share the financial
risk.91 The DMO receives a fixed monthly payment per child enrolled.92 However, risksharing and gain-sharing provisions ensure adequate coverage.93

The vendor pays

dentists on a fee-for-service basis.94 Rhode Island issued several mandates to its vendor.
The state charged the vendor with the responsibility of establishing and maintaining an
adequate network of providers.95 The state also charged the vendor with the task of
increasing provider rates closer to those paid by private preferred-provider
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87

Rhode Island implemented the RIte Smiles program originally under a § 1915(b) waiver, though it now
operates under a § 1115 waiver. The program was designed to further the success of the Oral Health
Access Project. Specifically, the state sought to eventually decrease Medicaid expenditures by encouraging
more utilization of preventive dental care and decreasing reliance on emergency and restorative procedures.
CHRISTINE A. PAYNE, MEDICAID RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PROJECT, RHODE ISLAND DEPT. OF HUMAN
SERVICES, RITE SMILES EVALUATION REPORT: TRENDS FROM 2002-2008 (May 17, 2010) at 4 (available at
http://www.dhs.ri.gov/Portals/0/Uploads/Documents/Public/Reports/ritesmiles_trends_2002_2008.pdf).
88
Id. at 8 (“Rhode Island transitioned from functioning simply as a payer of services to becoming a
purchaser of a new oral health delivery system”).
89
Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Caroline Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from
Other States, supra note 72, at 9.
94
Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).
95
CHRISTINE A. PAYNE, MEDICAID RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PROJECT, supra note 87, at 10-12.
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organizations.96 Provider reimbursement rates remain relatively low. In 2010, dentists
received only 35.4 percent of average national median retail fees.97
Rhode Island successfully improved access and utilization. Only twenty-seven
providers participated in Rhode Island’s older Medicaid program.98

This number

increased to one hundred eighty by 2010.99 More children also received more care. In
2005, before Rhode Island implemented its reforms, only 34.5 percent of children
received at least one dental service per year.100 In 2010, four years after implementation,
this rate increased by 28.1 percent to 44.2 percent of children receiving at least one dental
service.101 Total preventive visits increased by thirty-three percent and total treatment
visits increased by fifty percent.102

d. Florida’s Miami-Dade County Pilot Program
Florida’s attempt at reform proved not as successful.103

Under Florida’s

traditional Medicaid dental structure, the state contracts directly with dentists.104 The
state typically pays dentists on a fee-for-service basis.105 In 2004, Florida looked to
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Id.
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States,
Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 25.
98
CHRISTINE A. PAYNE, MEDICAID RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PROJECT, supra note 87, at 12.
99
Id.
100
Assessing the Impact of RI’s Managed Oral Health Program (RIte Smiles) on Access and Utilization of
Dental Care among Medicaid Children Ages Ten Years and Younger, MEDICINE & HEALTH RHODE ISLAND
(Rhode Island Medical Society, Providence, RI), Aug. 2011 at 248.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
A study by Dr. Burton L. Edelstein concluded that the program failed in terms of value. The study
defined value as “the benefit to the state in terms of quality of care for Medicaid dollars expended.” Burton
L. Edelstein, Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value for State
Dollars (Collins Center for Public Policy, Miami, FL) Aug. 2006 (available at
http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/Health_Care_Docs/MDCoPrepdDentalAnalysis8-06.pdf).
104
See Understanding the Impacts of Florida’s Medicaid Pre-Paid Dental Pilot, ORAL HEALTH ISSUE
BRIEF (2006) (available at
http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/Health_Care_Docs/Oral_Health_Pilot_Policy_Bri.pdf).
105
Id.
97

17!

managed care as a means of switching from being “payers” of dental care to being
“purchasers.”106 In the Medicaid Pre-Paid Dental Pilot, Florida contracted with a single
vendor, Atlantic Dental, Inc. (ADI).107 ADI bore the full risk for the cost of claims.108 In
turn, ADI passed the risk on to dentists by paying them an average amount of $4.28 per
patient per month instead of paying for individual services performed.109
This program failed to deliver value.110 Costs increased by one percent as quality
declined.111 Enrolled children visited the dentist less.112 Utilization declined by fortytwo percent.113 Dentist participation dropped by fifty-nine percent.114

e. South Carolina
South Carolina does not employ a carve-out. While beneficiaries have the option
to receive medical benefits from either a primary care case management program or the
state’s traditional Medicaid fee-for-service structure, the state administers all dental
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Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See supra note 103.
111
Total costs increased from $14.9 million to $15.1 million, a one percent increase. Quality of care
declined as fewer patients received timely care. Interestingly, however, consumer satisfaction remained
high. Burton L. Edelstein, Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value
for State Dollars, supra note 103, at 3-5. The consumer satisfaction survey may be suspect because
“[s]tates must take any positive feedback from Medicaid beneficiaries with a grain of salt…since many
Medicaid beneficiaries have never had good care and are therefore not the best judges of the level of care
they ought to receive.” Lisa Axelrod, The Trend Toward Medicaid Managed Care: Is the Government
Selling Out the Medicaid Poor?, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 267 (1998).
112
Burton L. Edelstein, Miami-Dade County Prepaid Dental Health Plan Demonstration: Less Value for
State Dollars, supra note 103, at 3 (“The average umber of dental visits per enrolled child decreased by
61% (from 0.60 visits to 0.24 visits)”).
113
Id. (“The percent of children “continuously” enrolled in the program who received at least one dental
visit declined by 42% (from 29% to 16%)”).
114
Id. (“The number of Dade County dentists who provided services to at least one child declined 59%
(from 669 dentists to 276 dentists)”).
107
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Medicaid benefits through its traditional Medicaid fee-for-service system.115

South

Carolina does not contract with any commercial agents to provide administrative services
either.116 The South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (SCHHS)
handles claim processing and directly enrolls dental providers.117 SCHHS then pays
providers on a fee-for-service basis.118 In 2000, SCHHS did employ administrative
reforms, however, in an effort to encourage provider participation.119 SCHHS eased
preauthorization requirements, streamlined claim procedures, and allowed extra
reimbursement for additional time spent treating children with special needs.120 The state
also increased reimbursement to match the seventy-fifth percentile of regional
commercial dental fees, but these rates have not been increased since.121
These reforms resulted in a 31.8% increase in provider participation within one
year.122 Utilization only increased 4.3% during this year.123 However, within seven
years of these reforms, utilization increased by 63.8% and provider participation
increased by 93.4%.124
For a summary of these administrative approaches, see Appendix B.

For a

comparison of the effectiveness of these approaches, see Appendix A.
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Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008 (available at
http://www.ada.org/2123.aspx).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population,
supra note 58, at 9.
120
Id.
121
Strides in Dental Access for Low-Income Children: Lessons Learned from Six States with Major DentalMedicaid Reforms (Doral), 2007 at 5.
122
See id. at 4-5; see also Alison Borchgrevnik, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, Increasing Access to
Dental Care in Medicaid: Does Raising Provider Rates Work? (California Healthcare Foundation,
Oakland, CA), March 2008, at 3.
123
Alison Borchgrevnik, Andrew Snyder, & Shelly Gehshan, Increasing Access to Dental Care in
Medicaid: Does Raising Provider Rates Work?, supra note 122 at 3.
124
Id.
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V.

Quantitative Evaluation of State Approaches125

While most states experienced improvement in utilization and provider
participation between 2000 and 2009, some states experienced more success than
others.126 Additionally, some states experienced improvement in less time than others.
These improvements can be attributed to numerous factors, including increased
reimbursement rates, new assistance programs, and administrative reform. Most states
incorporated all three changes into their reforms.127 Though utilization and provider
participation are influenced by more than just administrative reform, these administrative
reforms may account for a considerable percentage of improvement.
While states with relatively high payment rates often experienced better than
average rates of utilization,128 the trend does not account for the experiences of all states.
Some states succeeded in improving utilization without relying on significantly high rates
of reimbursement.

In 2007, of the twenty-seven states (including the District of

Columbia but excluding Mississippi, Delaware, and Kentucky)129 that demonstrated
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125

In this section, I rely on rates of improvement in utilization and provider participation in states that
employed different administrative models. I also rely on a comparison of 2007 utilization rates with 2007
reimbursement rates (as the percent of regional median retail fees reimbursed by Medicaid). I also compare
2009 utilization rates with 2010 average rates of reimbursement (as the percent of 2009 average regional
retail fees reimbursed by Medicaid in 2010). Neither data set allows for any definite conclusions. The
former data set may not reflect changes since 2007. The latter data set requires the assumption that the
2010 reimbursement rates were the same as in 2009.
126
See The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter, supra note 1, at 22.
127
See Strides in Dental Access for Low-Income Children: Lessons Learned from Six States with Major
Dental-Medicaid Reforms (Doral), 2007.
128
In 2007, eleven of twenty-one states that paid providers above the national average rate demonstrated
above average rates of utilization. See Appendix D. In 2009/2010, eleven of the eighteen states that paid
providers above the national average rate demonstrated above average rates of utilization. See Appendix C.
129
Insufficient data exists to include these states in the 2007 study. New Jersey’s statistics appear
somewhat suspect because the 2007 study suggests that providers received 105.7% of regional retail fees
and the 2009/2010 study suggests that providers received 42.8%. New Jersey also recently tried to improve
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above average utilization rates, sixteen states did so with payment rates below the
national average.130

In 2009, of the twenty-seven states (including the District of

Columbia) that demonstrated utilization rates above the national average, sixteen states
also did so with 2010 payment rates below the national average.131 This suggests that
states can improve utilization without significantly raising reimbursement rates. These
states used a variety of approaches in administering dental Medicaid benefits.132
However, most rely on a single non-risk commercial agent to administer dental Medicaid
benefits through a carve-out and pay providers on a fee-for-service basis.133 In fact, all of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
participation by reducing claim processing duration rather than increasing reimbursement rates. Caroline
Davis & Gretchen Brown, Managing California’s Medicaid Dental Program: Lessons from Other States,
supra note 72, at 12. My analysis includes New Jersey for lack of a clear explanation to suggest that this
data is incorrect, even though it seems suspect. Compare Appendix C with Appendix D.
130
These states include: New Mexico, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Colorado, Virginia, West Virginia,
Alabama, Vermont, Idaho, Utah, Washington, Iowa, Ohio, Nebraska, and Rhode Island. See Appendix D.
131
These states include: Virginia, Indiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Kansas, Vermont, Alabama,
New Mexico, Colorado, Nebraska, Illinois, Iowa, Washington, Idaho, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. See
Appendix C.
132
In 2007, the sixteen states with above average utilization and below average reimbursement rates
followed the following approaches. Eleven states used carve outs, while five used integrated structures.
Five states administered benefits themselves, nine contracted with some kind of outside agent, and two
states did both. Of the eleven states that contracted with outside agents, four contracted with multiple
agents, while seven only contracted with one agent. Of the eleven states that contracted with outside agents,
only two assigned some degree of risk to the agents. All of the sixnteen states that demonstrated above
average utilization with below average reimbursement rates paid providers on a fee-for-service basis. See
Appendix D; see also Appendix E.
In 2009/2010, the sixteen states with above average utilization and below average reimbursement
rates followed the following approaches. Eleven states used carve outs, while five used integrated
structures. Four states administered benefits themselves, ten contracted with some kind of outside agent,
and two states did both. Of the twelve states that contracted with outside agents, four contracted with
multiple agents, while eight only contracted with one agent. Of the twelve states that contracted with
outside agents, only two assigned some degree of risk to the agents. All of the seventeen states that
demonstrated above average utilization with below average reimbursement rates paid providers on a feefor-service basis. See Appendix C; see also Appendix E.
133
The ratio of states with above average utilization rates and below average reimbursement rates that
employ the approaches suggested by this note to those that do not, in most cases, exceeds the ratio of all
states that employ these approaches to those that do not. This demonstrates that these results reflect a trend
rather than just the national distribution of approaches. The ratio of these selected states that used carveouts to those that did not is 11:5; the national ratio is 26:25. The ratio of these states that contracted out
administrative duties to those that did not is 11:5; the national ratio is 14:3. The ratio of these states that
contracted with just one third-party to those that contracted with multiple third parties is 7:4; the national
ratio is 1:1. The ratio of these states that did not transfer risk to contractors to states that did transfer some
degree of risk is 4:1; the national ratio is 4:3. The ratio of these states that paid providers on a fee-forservice basis to those that used some degree of capitation was 17:0; the national ratio is 14:3. The only
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the sixteen states paid providers on a fee-for-service basis. Fee-for-service payment
appears a better option than capitated payment also because none of the states using any
degree of capitation demonstrated a utilization rate above the national average.134 Thus,
because states have demonstrated success without relying on significantly high
reimbursement rates, this model appears to be the most preferable option.
Furthermore, trends in utilization rates following certain types of administrative
reforms suggest that a single vendor system may be preferable. While every approach to
reform resulted in improvement, states that contracted through a single vendor generally
experienced more instantaneous progress than states that administrated dental Medicaid
benefits through a state agency or through multiple managed care plans. Tennessee,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Indiana all experienced better initial results than did South
Carolina, Arizona, and New Jersey.135
Data reflecting the failures of states to meet the national average utilization rate
suggests that high reimbursement rates do not necessarily translate into high utilization
rates. In 2007, of the twenty-one states that demonstrated below-average utilization
rates,136 eleven states did so with payments rates above the national average.137 This
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ratio that did not exceed the national ratio was that of states that contracted out administrative duties to
those that did not. However, the difference was not great enough to suggest that self-administration by
states was a preferable option to contracting out these duties. See Appendix D; see also Appendix E.
134
See Appendix C.
135
See Appendix A.
136
I exclude Delaware and Kentucky due to a lack of available data. In 2007, both Delaware and Kentucky
failed to meet the national average utilization rate, so, in total twenty-three states did not meet the national
average utilization rate in 2007. See Appendix D.
137
These states include: New Jersey, the District of Columbia, South Dakota, Wyoming, Arkansas,
Maryland, New York, Louisiana, North Dakota, Nevada, and Missouri. See Appendix D.
The data from 2009/2010 is less clear. In 2009/2010, of the twenty-three states that demonstrated
below-average utilization rates, seven states did so with payment rates above the national average. These
states include: Delaware, Alaska, North Dakota, Wyoming, Louisiana, and Connecticut. See Appendix C.
Some of these states, such as Alaska, North Dakota, and Wyoming, face challenges related to geography.
However, failures by Delaware and Connecticut to sustain high utilization rates do not allow for any
conclusions to be drawn. Both states employ nearly polar opposite administrative approaches. Delaware’s
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suggests that reimbursement rates are not the only factor affecting utilization. Of these
states that failed to meet the national average utilization rate with payment rates above
the national average, most states used an integrated structure and contracted out at least
some administrative duties.138 However, most of these states contracted with multiple
vendors, and most transferred risk to these vendors.139 Far more of these states capitated
providers than did the states that met the national average utilization rate without
reimbursing providers higher than average rates.140 This again suggests that a carve-out
administered by a single nonrisk vendor that pays providers on a fee-for-service basis is a
preferable mode of administration.
While some trends are discernible from this data, a quantitative approach may not
be wholly sufficient. It is difficult to account for all of the many factors that affect
utilization and provider participation. No state is the same as another, so one cannot
expect reforms to encourage improvement at the same rate. Medicaid beneficiaries in
some states may face more language barriers than others, while those in other states may
face more geographical barriers. In many cases, factors that affect dentist participation
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state Medicaid agency administers dental Medicaid benefits without the help of an outside contractor. In
fact, dental providers in Delaware interact more with the state agency than do providers in other states.
Dental providers have to enroll directly with the fee-for-service program or with one of the eight stateoperated clinics. Until 1997, in order to treat Medicaid patients, providers worked as direct employees of
the state-run clinics. On the other hand, Connecticut’s reforms in the early 2000s mirror those proposed by
this note. Connecticut created a carve-out and reduced the amount of vendors it contracted with to one
vendor. Connecticut also ceased transferring risk to its vendors. Burton L. Edelstein, Understanding the
Connecticut Dental Medicaid Reform Proposal: State Options in Contracting Dental Care in Medicaid
(Connecticut Health Foundation, Hartford, CT), Mar. 2003 (available at http://www.cthealth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/understanding-the-ct-dental-medicaid-reform-proposal.pdf). Thus, the isolated
experiences of two states may not offer sufficient data to draw any conclusion that one approach is better
than the other.
138
Eight states used integrated systems, while only three used carve-outs. Nine contracted out at least
some administrative duties, while two did not. See Appendix D; see also Appendix E.
139
Six contracted with multiple vendors, while only three contracted with a single vendor. Six states
transferred at least some risk to these vendors, while only three did not.
140
While no states that demonstrated above-average utilization rates with below-average reimbursement
rates paid providers on a capitated basis, four of the eleven states that fell below the national average
utilization rate with above-average reimbursement rates capitated at least some providers.
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may not be easily quantifiable. For example, forces beyond payment and administrative
ease encourage dentists to treat Medicaid patients.

Many dentists feel a sense of

obligation to their communities to help those in need despite low payment and
administrative hassles.141 This draw is difficult to quantify. The available research may
simply not be comprehensive enough to account for all of these possible factors.142
However, a single vendor system, in which the vendor takes on little or no risk and pays
providers on a fee-for-service basis, presents itself as the ideal administrative structure
for other more qualitative reasons.

VI.

The Ideal Administrative Reform

States have increased participation by dentists and utilization by enrollees through
administrative reforms. States can reform Medicaid structures across five dimensions.
First, states can carve-out dental benefits from existing Medicaid administrative
structures or integrate dental benefits with medical benefits.

Second, states can

administer Medicaid dental benefits themselves or do so through private vendors. Third,
if a state adopts the latter approach, the state must decide whether to contract with a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Dentists Not Impressed with Medicaid, The Wealthy Dentist,
http://thewealthydentist.com/surveyresults/084-dental-medicaid-patients.htm (last visited April 23, 2012).
142
Social science assessments, such as these, are made difficult to quantify with empirical evidence
because of a lack of research analyzing the human and social consequences of different approaches. This is
certainly true, at least, in so far as it applies to the assessment of new technologies. Researchers mainly
focus on whether new technologies perform as intended and on diagnostic accuracy. Often times, little is
known about the actual impact on the patient’s health or on social consequences, such as the cost
effectiveness of the new technology. The question of cost effectiveness may be the most crucial inquiry
when available health resources in the real world will limit the application of the new technology. Henry J.
Aaron, Health Care Rationing: Inevitable but Impossible?, 96 GEO. L.J. 539, 540 (2008). Similarly, dental
Medicaid reform success must be measured in terms of its total impact on individuals and society. High
utilization rates may not necessarily translate into good dental health. Thus, this empirical evidence may
not provide a complete picture of the state of dental health. The qualitative analysis provided in Section VI
tries to fill some of these gaps.
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single vendor or multiple vendors. Fourth, the state must then determine the amount of
financial risk that the vendor or vendors should bear. Lastly, states have the option of
limiting how much risk vendors can transfer to dental providers.
To best improve provider participation and utilization of care by enrollees, states
should contract with a single commercial vendor to exclusively provide dental benefits.
The state should assume at least some degree of risk, while capitalizing on the vendor’s
established network, expertise, and commonplace claims procedures. The state should
also provide that the vendor must pay providers on a fee-for-service basis.

a. Carve-out vs. Integration

States should carve out their dental program from the traditional Medicaid
structures.

Carve-outs result in more effective administration of dental benefits.143

Separate dental programs receive their own budget and own separate administrator. A
separate budget prevents funds from being diverted from dental benefits to medical
benefits.144 Both courts and states have sponsored carve-outs as appropriate remedies for
addressing previously unmet and overlooked needs.145 Such was the impetus behind
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Of the sixteen states that demonstrated above average utilization in 2009 while still reimbursing
providers less than average rates in 2010, eleven states used carve outs, while six used integrated structures.
See Appendix C; see also Appendix E.
144
Kim McPherson, State Strategies to Improve Dental Compliance in Missouri’s Medicaid Population,
supra note 58, at 9.
145
While this piece focuses on failures by Medicaid programs to address dental health in underage
populations, Medicaid programs may also have to address the special dental needs of other populations.
For a discussion of the adjustments states must make to Medicaid structures to help young children,
pregnant women, people with developmental disabilities, and people in rural areas, see Andrew Snyder,
Increasing Access to Dental Care in Medicaid: Targeted Programs for Four Populations, supra note 46.
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Tennessee’s reforms.146 These approaches suggest that carve-outs are better suited for
addressing the needs of specific undertreated populations. Tennessee’s carve-out now
works within the state’s budget. Legislators directly allocate funds each year to dental
health.147 Underfunding becomes a conscious act of resource allocation, not a mere
oversight. These dental programs also benefit from an administrator whose expertise and
focus relates just to dental health.

Additionally, carve-outs allow for greater

accountability when dental performance stands alone from medical performance.148 Poor
dental health cannot hide behind the cloak of improvement in other health measurements.
Dental providers typically prefer carve-outs to both managed care structures and state-run
structures that administer both medical and dental benefits.149

Neither dentists nor

doctors are trained to practice both medicine and dentistry.150 Challenges may exist in
creating systems that would allow the sharing of information between doctors and
dentists.151 Thus, carve-outs may allow for the more effective administration of dental
Medicaid benefits.
On the other hand, integration of dental and health benefit administration does
present some benefits. Integration allows for care coordination. For example, New
Jersey’s managed care organizations expedite organ transplants that require preliminary
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David Neumeister, State and Community Models for Improving Access to Dental Care for the
Underserved – A White Paper, supra note 59, at 15.
147
Id. at 17.
148
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dental clearance.152 States can also ensure that dental benefits receive proper funding by
laying out specific minimum benefits in their contracts with MCOs.

For example,

Arizona sets minimum benefit standards for MCOs.153 These benefits include ensuring
that beneficiaries can see the dentist at least twice a year for preventive care and the care
that they receive is consistent with the community standard of care.154 Arizona also
requires that MCOs maintain adequate networks.155

These improvements in care

coordination are possible in an integrated Medicaid structure.
Integration may also improve utilization by capitalizing off of Medicaid
beneficiaries’ tendencies to seek primary care more so than dental care. Arizona requires
that physicians screen Medicaid enrollees for dental health problems and refer them to
dentists.156 In New Jersey, AmeriChoice pays physicians forty percent of their original
reimbursement amount if the referral results in a dental visit.157 The plan reported that
utilization doubles for beneficiaries that see physicians that refer.158 However, budgets
are further strained by this reimbursement system as physicians need to reimbursed for
screening patients. Additionally, just one trip to the dentist creates unique dilemmas for
Medicaid enrollees.

Enrollees usually lack access to transportation, cannot afford

childcare and must pay public transportation rates for their children to make the trip as
well, and must travel long distances to more affluent areas where dentists tend to
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practice.159 Facing these barriers twice may not be feasible for patients facing these
barriers. Thus, carve-outs allow states to avoid these dilemmas.
In practice, states that have used carve-outs have experienced success in
improving access and utilization. In Tennessee, provider participation improved by more
than one hundred twenty percent following a series of reforms to the dental Medicaid
program, including the switch to a carve-out.160 Utilization by children improved from
thirty-six percent to fifty-one percent within four years of these reforms.161 On the other
hand, Arizona, which relies on MCOs to administer both dental and medical benefits, has
also experienced success. Medicaid utilization increased from below thirty percent in
2000 when payment structure reform had just taken place to 47.2% in 2009.162 Both
experience and reason suggest that carving out dental benefits from the administration of
other Medicaid benefits can eventually lead to more Medicaid children receiving more
dental care.

b. Administration through Private Vendor vs. Self-administration

States should hire private vendors to administer dental benefits, rather than
administer benefits themselves. In fact, many states already use fiscal agents to handle
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administrative tasks, including processing claims and responding to provider inquiries.163
However, these fiscal agents come in many forms, some specializing in information
technology and others specializing in maintaining dental provider networks.164 States
should opt for commercial vendors that already maintain private networks. Fiscal agents
specialized in information technology can effectively process claims, but they lack a
personal connection to providers. Through private administration, states can build on
already existing provider networks instantaneously while drawing on experience that
transcends basic administrative tasks.165

Managed care professionals have more

experience in quality review and adjustment compared to state employees.166
Additionally, dental providers prefer claims processes and payment systems that align
with the commercial plans through which they are already paid.167 Submitting claims to
government agencies that use separate codes and take longer to process payments
presents an unnecessary obstacle between the provider and the major financial incentives.
Clearly, the use of a private commercial agent provides many benefits.
The involvement of managed care with Medicaid programs is not without its
critics, however. Some argue that because a managed care contract builds in some degree
of profit margin, contracting with a commercial vendor entails an unnecessary extra level
of expense.168 Others have criticized how haphazardly states entered into managed care
agreements in the 1990s with plans that were not experienced in administering benefits to
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Medicaid patients.169 Because of the complexity of establishing effective oversight and
review procedures, establishing these programs may take over two years.170 States must
also ensure that vendors have the resources to address the unique needs of Medicaid
patients. Commercial vendors typically do not have enough staff capable of speaking
other languages.171 Commercial vendors also do not usually operate networks in poor
areas, so transportation then becomes a new concern.172 However, states can address
these concerns without necessarily abandoning the option to contract with commercial
vendors. The responsibility falls upon the state to not rush into these agreements without
ensuring that the vendor can address these challenges. Contracting with only a single
vendor will ease the burden of negotiation and later performance review. States can also
adopt data collection, monitoring, and evaluation modules that have worked in states
already using a private vendor system.173 By adopting such measures, states can evaluate
whether the administrative efficiencies of third-party administration have reduced costs
or improved dental health enough to substantiate the extra profit margin built into the
managed care contract.
Some states appealed to the needs of providers without contracting out
administrative duties. For example, South Carolina eased administrative burdens without
turning to a commercial vendor.174 Provider participation in South Carolina subsequently
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increased by 93.4% in six years.175 Alternatively, states that have contracted with private
commercial vendors experienced similar improvements in less time.

Rhode Island

witnessed an over seven hundred percent increase in just two years.176 In Tennessee,
provider participation improved 111.7% in three years.177 The use of private commercial
vendors allows states to tap into already existing networks immediately. Given the state
of dental health, many enrollees may not be able to wait six years until they can finally
see a dentist.

c. Single Vendor vs. Multiple Vendors

States should contract with a single vendor rather than multiple vendors. This
structure best addresses the interests of both providers and patients. Providers may not be
interested in navigating through different claims processes.178 In Tennessee, providers
only deal with a single set of rules, a single claims payer, a single agreement, a single
credentialing process, and a single fee schedule.179 As each one of these procedures may
be unique to each vendor, the potential for inconvenience is clear. Patients may also be
confused by multiple different options.180 Furthermore, by contracting with only a single
vendor, the state will reduce administrative costs while allowing for stronger oversight.181
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Virginia relies on a single dental benefits administrator and benefits from the
centralization of data.182 Virginia works with the vendor to analyze the data.183 A vendor
competing within a multiple-vendor system does not have such an ability to assess the
full scope of dental health within the state. The single-vendor system, thus, aligns with
the interests of states, providers, and the patients.
Multiple-vendor systems offer some advantages as well, but these primarily help
just the state rather than providers and patients. Multiple vendors can compete against
each other, thus potentially lowering the cost of dental benefits for the state.184 A
multiple-vendor system also provides the state the benefit of cross-plan performance
review.185 This allows states to differentiate between plan-specific deficiencies and
systemic deficiencies. Additionally, some note that the multiple-vendor systems that
have failed in the past failed primarily due to a lack of funding, as opposed to any
inherent flaw.186

A multiple-vendor system provides the state with some unique

advantages, but providers and patients may be left confused and frustrated.
Overall, a single-vendor system can most effectively and efficiently administer
dental Medicaid benefits. A single-vendor system benefits all parties involved – the
state, dental providers, and Medicaid beneficiaries. A multiple-vendor system benefits
the state in some ways, but it inconveniences both providers and patients in others.
Contracting and performance review also becomes a laborious process if done properly.
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d. Degree of Risk Placed on Vendor

In structuring the contract with the single vendor, states should refrain from
placing the entire risk of the program on the vendor. Risk should be mitigated through
risk-sharing and gain-sharing clauses or administrative services only contracts.

As

Medicaid is an individual entitlement, the entity at risk cannot deny care when funding is
depleted.187 This makes calculating risk difficult.188 Because of this, managed care
organizations often avoid accepting full-risk contracts.189 Practically speaking, it may be
the case that the state has no other option but to accept some degree of risk.
Even if a vendor wishes to accept full risk, the vendor may be conflicted between
encouraging utilization and simultaneously cutting costs.190 Historically, programs that
have refrained from full-risk contracts have experienced more success. Rhode Island
employed risk-sharing and gain-sharing.191 On the other hand, Florida tried a similar
program that differed in that it placed full risk on its vendor.192 Florida’s program failed,
as providers dropped out and access became more limited.193 Florida’s program also
failed to bring about the theoretical cost-savings, the purpose behind transferring full
risk.194 In Rhode Island, patients visited dentists fifty percent more frequently and
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provider participation increased by over seven hundred percent.195

Tennessee and

Virginia have used administrative services only contracts. Tennessee and Virginia have
also improved access and utilization.196

Successes in these states contrasted with

Florida’s less fortunate experience demonstrate the importance of the state retaining some
risk. To ensure that dental Medicaid administration encourages the maximum amount of
utilization, states should avoid creating adverse incentives. No-risk or mitigated-risk
contracts would achieve better results.

e. Degree of Risk Placed on Provider

Just as vendors should not fully bear the burden of financial risk, providers should
also not bear this risk. Arizona explicitly prohibited its managed care plans from passing
risk on to providers by paying on a per beneficiary per month basis rather than on a feefor-service basis.197 Participation subsequently increased.198 Most dental providers rely
on fee-for-service payments from private insurers.199

For this reason, capitation

represents an inconvenience that most dentists have never had to adapt to. Additionally,
under private plans that do capitate dental providers, access sometimes suffers because
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dentists have no financial incentive to actually treat patients.200

Capitation aligns

incentives with current barriers to utilization of dental care by Medicaid patients.
Dentists will be less likely to schedule follow-up appointments, reach out to patients who
have not received preventive care in a long time, or try to solve the problems involved
with missed appointments. Capitation has also resulted in decreased patient satisfaction
in California.

Under California’s Healthy Family Program (HFP), the three dental

maintenance organization plans that capitate providers have proven more cost-effective
than the fee-for-service exclusive provider organization plans, but patient satisfaction
remains lower in these plans.201 Because states should avoid inconveniencing dental
providers in order to encourage utilization, states should opt for the more familiar fee-forservice payment system and absorb the possible extra costs associated with it.

VII.

Conclusion

Together with increases to reimbursement rates and the creation of new outreach
initiatives, administrative reform can set states in a positive direction to improving dental
health in the Medicaid population. States can customize administrative structures to the
exact needs of Medicaid providers and patients. Any costs related to contracting out
administrative duties and subsequent performance review will be recouped once a culture
of proactive dental care is fostered in the minds of Medicaid patients and once these
patients can actually find that care. A proactive system where patients receive early
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preventive care will prove much less costly than a reactive system where patients who
have never seen a dentist rely on emergency room services. Both states and patients alike
cannot afford to allow this dental health crisis to grow any worse by doing nothing to
adapt Medicaid structures to the realities of the situation.
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Appendix A
Trends in Utilization Provider Participation
State
National Avg.
TN
2002-2009
SC
2000-2011

AZ
2002-2009
RI
2005-2010
MI
2000-2009
VA
2005-2007
IN
1997-2007
NJ
2000-2006
Miami-Dade
County Pilot
2003-2005

Time SpanIncreases in Utilization Increases in Participation
9 Years
~46 N/A
2 Years
38.5
81.3
3 Years
38.5
111.7
8 Years
~78.5
N/A
1 Year
4.3
31.8
2 Years
N/A
43.1
6 Years
47.5
N/A
7 Years
63.8
93.4
11 Years
~98.9
N/A
1 Year
10.5
N/A
5 Years
25.3
N/A
7 Years
~57.3
~70.3
1 Year
N/A
~500
5 Years
28.1
703.7
2 Years
~30
150
6 Years
43
N/A
9 Years
~75.2
N/A
1 Year
>30
21
2 Years
N/A
76.9
3 Years
77.8
42.3
8 Years
~122*
85.3
10 Years
N/A
87.4
1 Year
1
N/A
3 Years
29.4
N/A
6 Years
52.9
N/A
2 Years
-42
-59

Rate Trend
increased to 75th

75th percentile
but not raised since

2010 - 68.9% of dentists' median retail fees

2006 - $7.82 per kid per month
2010 - 35.4% of dentists' median retail fees (weighted average)
83-111% of average charges in region
but $25 per service less than national 75th percentile
fee schedule increased by 28%
Increased rates but haven't adjusted
for inflation
Medicaid Rates are about 1st-3rd percentile of State Percentiles
Resisted Increasing Rates
Only Paid $4.28 per patient per month

*(but enrollment declined)
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Appendix B
Summary of State Approaches to Dental Medicaid Administration
TN

SC

AZ

RI

MI

VA

IN

NJ

Carve-out vs. Integration

Carve-out

Integration

Integration

Carve-Out

Carve-out

Carve-Out

Integration

Carve-Out

Carve-Out

Managed Care vs. Self-Administration

Managed
Care

SelfAdministration

Managed
Care

Managed
Care

Still
integrated
but dental
benefits are
administered
separately in
the counties
selected for
the pilot
program
Managed
Care

Managed
Care

Managed
Care

Managed
Care

Managed
Care

Single Vendor vs. Multiple Vendors

Single DBM

-

18 MCOs

Single Vendor

SelfAdministered
(other
Medicaid
benefits are
administered
through
managed
care)
-

Degree of Risk on Vendor

ASO Contract

-

Full Risk on
Vendors

Provider Reimbursement Structure FFS vs. Capitation

FFS

FFS

FFS
(capitation
explicitly
prohibited)

Single DBM
Single DBM
for counties
participating
in pilot
Risk-Sharing ASO contract ASO Contract
& GainSharing
Provisions
FFS
FFS
FFS
FFS (changed
from
capitation)

Dade County Model Reform

Single Vendor Single Vendor

Full Risk on
Vendors

Full Risk on
Vendor

State retains
some degree
of risk

Both FFS &
Capitation

Capitation

FFS

Appendix C
2009 Utilization Rates and 2010 Payment Rates by State

State
AK
DC
DE
CT
MD
AZ
MA
LA
TN
ND
WY
OK
AR
TX
WV
SD
MS
NH
NATIONAL
VA
IN
NY
SC
MT
NC
KS
NV
VT
AL
NM
KY
GA
CO
NE
PA
IL
IA
MO
WA
ME
MI
OH
OR
ID
NJ
MN
HW
WI
RI
UT
CA
FL

Utilization
Payment
Rate (2009) Rate (2010)
42
91.4
44.6
84.1
41.1
80
42.5
78.5
41.8
70.7
47.2
68.9
52.3
68.6
41.8
67.9
46.4
67.3
36.9
66.2
43.5
65.3
46
64.4
57.1
63.9
59.8
63.8
48.5
62.5
46
62.4
45.5
61.9
54.2
61.8
43.8
60.5
45.7
59.4
47.4
58
38.4
57.3
51.9
57.1
29.9
55.6
51.1
55.5
45.4
55
41.9
54.7
57.3
54.5
49.9
53.6
49.8
53.5
40.8
51.9
42.5
51.9
46.6
51.1
52.5
49.4
37.3
48.8
46.5
48.4
53.8
46.8
30.3
46.7
52.4
46.5
40.3
46.5
36.8
45.9
42.7
43.9
38.8
43.3
67.7
43
40.9
42.8
42.1
40.1
45.8
37.7
30.1
36.4
46.7
35.4
42.6
33.2
38.9
32.8
25.7
27.5

Note: Green shading indicates that state
demonstrated above average rates of
utilization.
Sources
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C.), May 2011.

Appendix D
2007 Utilization Rates and Payment Rates by State

State
MS
DE
KY
NJ
DC
SD
NV
CT
TX
WY
AZ
AR
MD
NY
AK
NH
IL
LA
NC
TN
OK
MA
ND
MO
SC
National
NM
GA
HW
IN
MT
KS
CO
VA
WV
PA
AL
VT
MN
OR
ID
UT
WA
IA
OH
NE
WI
FL
MI
ME
CA
RI

Median
Retail
Fee
33
35
33
35
35
35
35
37
32
35
35
32
35
35
46
37
36
32
35
33
32
37
35
35
35
N/A
35
35
46
36
35
35
35
35
35
35
33
37
35
46
35
35
46
35
36
35
36
35
36
37
46
37

Medicaid
Reimbursement
Rates
N/A
N/A
N/A
37
35
34
33.24
35
29.44
32
29.5
26.6
29.08
29
38
29
28
24.8
27.01
25
23.5
27
24.1
24
23.4
N/A
22.97
22.77
29.12
22.58
21.89
21
20.8
20.15
20
20
18
20
18.7
24.07
17.76
17.55
22.44
16.63
17.08
16
15.92
15
14.89
13
15
10

Percent of
Median Retail
Fee Reimbursed
by Medicaid
Utilization Rates
N/A
38.1
N/A
35.5
N/A
24.5
105.71
33.9
100.00
35.5
97.14
37
94.97
27.5
94.59
41.4
92.00
53.7
91.43
37.3
84.29
40.1
83.13
29.5
83.09
36.1
82.86
33.7
82.61
41.9
78.38
47
77.78
40.1
77.50
32.4
77.17
45.7
75.76
40.2
73.44
42.7
72.97
44.6
68.86
28.1
68.57
27.9
66.86
46.9
65.99
38.1
65.63
47.6
65.06
23.8
63.30
39.9
62.72
43
62.54
29.2
60.00
41.2
59.43
40.2
57.57
40.8
57.14
45.6
57.14
32.2
54.55
51.9
54.05
57.1
53.43
37.7
52.33
34.9
50.74
42.8
50.14
39.5
48.78
47.6
47.51
46.9
47.44
39.9
45.71
49.9
44.22
25.7
42.86
23.5
41.36
34.5
35.14
37.1
32.61
31.3
27.03
43.8

Note: Green shading indicates that state
demonstrated above average rates of utilization.

Sources
Cynthia Stark, Oral Health Checkup: Progress in Tough Fiscal Times?, National Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief No. 836 (March 29, 2010) (available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB836_OralHealthCheckup_03-29-2010.pdf).
The State of Children’s Dental Health: Making Coverage Matter (The Pew Center on the States, Washington, D.C.), May 2011 at 25 (available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/The_State_of_Children's_Dental_health.pdf).

Appendix E
State Approaches to Dental Medicaid Administration

State

Carve-out or
Integration?

AL

Integrated

AK
AZ

Integrated
Integrated

AR

Integrated
EPSDT services
(including oral health
assessments)
administered by state
agency / Dental
provider diagnostic,
preventative and
treatment services are
managed by Denti-Cal
(through Delta Dental)
Integrated (but
dentists directly enroll
with state ffs program
while physicians
participate in managed
care plans, primary
care physician plans,
or ffs plan)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through managed
care)

CA

CO

CT

DE

DC

FL

GA

HW

ID

IL

IN

IA

KS

Administration
Single Nonrisk
Contractor
Single Nonrisk
Contractor
MCOs
Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS
FFS
FFS
FFS

EPSDT services
administered by
state / Other
preventative and
restorative
services - 95%
FFS administator
/ 5% MCOs

Mostly FFS/Some
Capitation in
Populated Counties
(dentists are
employees in one
plan)

State Agency

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor
State Agency
(directly enroll
with state under
ffs program or in
8 state-operated
clinics)

FFS (before 1997,
dentists were hired as
employees of clinics)

Both State
Administered
Plans &
Managed Care
Plans

FFS
FFS in State
Administered Plans
(except in a few
counties) / Capitation
in Managed Care
Plans

MCOs

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS

Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through managed
care)
Integrated (but MCOs
subcontract with
dental care
organizations (DCOS)
to managed program
that pays on ffs basis) MCOs

Integrated
Integrated (but MCOs
subcontract with
dental care
organizations (DCOS)
to managed program
that pays on ffs basis)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through managed
care)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through primary care
case management
system)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through primary care
case management
system)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through managed
care)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through managed
care)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered
through both a ffs
system and managed
care)

Payment Type

FFS

Multiple Nonrisk
Contractors
FFS

Multiple Nonrisk
Contractors
FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS
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KY
LA
ME

MD

MA

MI

MN
MS

MO
MT

NE

NV
NH

NJ

NM

NY

Integrated (managed
care plans subcontract
with DCO and primary
care case
management manages
through nonrisk fiscal
agents)
Integrated
Integrated

Managed Care
(25%) /
Nonrisk Agents
(75%)
State Agency
State Agency

Integrated (but MCOs Managed Care
subcontract with
Plans (95%) /
dental care
Stateorganizations (DCOS)) administered
but state began
(5% but state
initiative to start carve- seeks to
out in 2008
develop)
Carve-out (Other
benefits administered Single Nonrisk
through mostly
Contractor (with
managed care)
Subcontractor)
Carve-out (other
State Agency
benefits administered (68%) / Nonrisk
through MCOs or
Contractor
Medicaid Health Plans) (32%)
Integrated (started a
pilot program to
MCOs (and
experiment with a non- subcontractors)
managed care carve- (83%) - except
out but program is
where pilot still
being phased out)
operates (17%)
Single Nonrisk
Integrated
Contractor
Single Managed
Care Plan
administered by
2 DCOs (63%) except in
counties without
managed care
(state
administers ffs
program w/
fiscal agent)
Integrated
(37%)
Single Nonrisk
Integrated
Contractor
State
administered
managed care
Integrated
program
Nonrisk
Contractor
Integrated (but ffs
Administered in
program is carved out Rural Counties
of managed care in
(32%) / 2 MCOs
rural areas)
(68%)
Single Nonrisk
Integrated
Contractor
Managed Care
(91%) / Stateadministered
(w/ fiscal agent)
(9% - including
special needs
Integrated
children)

Integrated

Integrated

MCOs (w/
subcontractors)
(80%) / Stateadministered
(w/ fiscal agent)
(20% - including
Native American
children) but
shifting to
managed care
28 MCOs (80%)
/ Stateadministered
(w/ fiscal agent)
(20%)

FFS
FFS
FFS
FFS (All plans have to
reimburse ffs if the
benefit is covered by
the ffs program, but
MCOs are free to
negotiate with
providers if benefit is
not covered by ffs
program)

FFS

FFS

Both FFS & Capitation
FFS

Capitated (63%) /
FFS (37%)
FFS

FFS

FFS
FFS

Mostly FFS / Some
Capitation

FFS

Both FFS & Capitation
(and combination
thereof)
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OH

Carve-out (Medical
benefits administered
through 2 primary
care care management
programs but dental
services are
Single Nonrisk
exempted)
Contractor
Carve-out (medical
benefits administered
through primary care
case management
program but dental
services are excluded) State Agency
Managed Care
(83%) / Stateadministered
Integrated
(17%)

OK

Integrated

OR

Integrated

PA

Integrated
Carve-out (medical
benefits administered
through multiple
managed care plans
but transitioning from
state-administered ffs
program to single MCO
w/ risk-sharing
Integrated

NC

ND

RI
SC

SD

TN

TX

UT

VT

VA

WA

Carve-out (Medical
benefits administered
through primary care
care management
program)
Carve-out (medical
benefits administered
through several
managed care plans)
Carve-out (Medical
benefits administered
through primary care
care management
program or managed
care plans)
Carve-out (rural
counties - other
benefits administered
through primary care
case management
program, managed
care or traditional ffs;
urban counties managed care)
Carve-out (Medical
benefits administered
through primary care
care management
program)
Carve-out (Medical
benefits administered
through primary care
care management
program, managed
care, and some
through traditional ffs)
Carve-out (medical
benefits administered
through several
managed care plans)

FFS

FFS

FFS
FFS (before - 2004 State Agency
allowed capitation for
(w/ fiscal agent) nonrural areas)
MCOs (w/
subcontractors)
(96%) / Stateadministered
(4% - mostly
Native American Capitated (96%) /
children)
FFS (4%)
Nonrisk
Contractor
(27%) /
Managed Care
(73%)
FFS

Single MCO
(31%) / Stateadministered
(69%)
State Agency
Single Nonrisk
Contractor
(2007 renegotiated
contract to
exclude risk)

FFS
FFS

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS

Stateadministered

FSS

Two Nonrisk
Contractors
working
together

FFS

Single Nonrisk
Contractor

FFS

Stateadministered

FFS
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WV

WI
WY

Carve-out (Medical
benefits administered
through primary care
care management
program and managed Single Nonrisk
care)
Contractor
Single Nonrisk
Contractor
Partial carve-out (most (60%) / MCOs
receive medical
(subcontracting
benefits through
w/ DCOs) (40%
managed care)
urban counties)
Single Nonrisk
Carve-out
Contractor

FFS

FFS (Nonrisk
Contractor) / Both
- FFS & Capitated
(MCOs)
FFS

Source
Medicaid Compendium Update (American Dental Assn., Chicago, IL), 2008.
Are dental
benefits
administered
separately?
Integrated
Carve-out
Both
How many used
contractors?
Stateadministered
Commercial
Vendor
Both
Of those using
contractors,
how many
states
transferred risk
to vendors?
Vendors assume
some risk
Vendors assume
no risk
Some vendors
assume risk, but
others do not
Of those using
contractors,
how many
contactors are
used?
Used multiple
vendors
Used only one
vendor
Provider
Reimbursement
Type
FSS
Just Capitation
Both

25
22
4

9
32
10

11
24

7

21
21

42
0
9

